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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the widespread use of incentive pay, there is limited evidence about what 
factors influence its organization-wide, broad-based application. This study uses data from three 
sources and multiple levels, including a unique data set of the total compensation of individual 
employees in 104 firms over a four-year period (1997-2000), and theoretically and empirically 
examines the use of bonuses and stock options in organization-wide applications.  We examine 
the efficacy of three main rational theories, principal-agency, positivist agency and contingency 
theories, which are based on the premise that incentives are related to performance.  At the 
individual level we identify two determinants: type of job and level within the hierarchy and four 
determinants at the organizational level: performance, risk, size, and strategy.  Our results 
indicate that the factors derived from the three theories provide a limited explanation for the 
variation in the use of broad-based incentives within and across organizations.  
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Organization-wide Broad-based Incentives: 
Rational Theory and Evidence 
 
The use of variable pay has grown in popularity over the past decade with 67% of 
companies offering some form of variable compensation to employees below the executive level 
(Abosch 1998).  Despite its widespread use, however, there is limited evidence about what 
factors influence the use of broad-based (i.e., over 50% of employees eligible) variable pay.  
While the rhetoric in the professional literature assumes that performance-based incentives 
improve organizational performance, the scholarly literature is less affirmative.  At the CEO 
level, several studies report a causal relationship (Mehran 1995; Finkelstein and Boyd 1998; 
Anderson, Banker et al. 2000).  However, others remain skeptical about causation in the pay – 
performance relationship for CEOs (Hall and Murphy, 2000).  Below the level of senior 
executive, theory and evidence suggests that in addition to causal ambiguity, widespread use 
may not be effective in all cases.  Gerhart and Milkovich’s (1990) and Abowd’s (1990) 
longitudinal studies of managerial compensation in Fortune 500 organizations suggested that 
companies paying a higher proportion of variable pay to base salary, also had higher 
subsequent financial performance, however, these results varied depending how performance 
was defined (Abowd, 1990) and whether the company was historically profitable (Gerhart & 
Milkovich, 1990).  Other researchers have found that variable pay’s effectiveness depends on 
the risk of the organization’s earnings stream (Garen, 1994;Bloom & Milkovich, 1996; Aggarwal 
& Samwick, 1999), level of monitoring (Beatty & Zajac, 1996; Gray & Cannella, 1995) or fit with 
business level strategy (Boyd & Salamin, 2001;Montemayor, 1996;Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 
1992).  
Both researchers and practitioners have interests in understanding the application and 
efficacy of using broad-based incentives.  This goal, however, is challenging for two reasons.  
The first is that different theories often offer somewhat different interpretations about how the 
incentive compensation-organization performance relationship works.  Even rationally based 
theories whose premise is that better compensation practices result in better organizational 
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performance differs.  For example, agency theory arguably the dominant rational theory with 
respect to this topic, has developed along two lines: positivist and principal-agent (Eisenhardt, 
1988; Beatty & Zajac, 1994).  While the two streams share common assumptions about people, 
organizations and information, they differ in their focus and in their dependent variable 
(Eisenhardt, 1988).  Principal agent-theory focuses on the incentive effects of variable pay and 
the reduction of agency costs as the path to improved shareholder performance.  Positivist 
agency theory suggests that monitoring rather than incentives may be more cost effective, 
particularly when the use of incentives shifts too much risk to the individual or when outcomes 
are not easily measured.  Contingency theory, another theory widely used to explain 
compensation-organization performance, focuses on the alignment of a bundle of compensation 
practices that support the company’s overall strategy.  Accordingly, organizational performance 
may be related not simply to variable pay but to how well total compensation, which includes all 
components of pay, "fits" with the organization’s strategy (Gerhart, 2000; Montemayor, 1996; 
Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992).  Typical in this vein of research, Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 
(1992) found that different bundles of 13 forms of compensation fit two different organization 
strategies, which they labeled algorithmic and experiential.  
The second reason research on broad-based incentives is challenging is that publicly 
available compensation data below the executive level is difficult to obtain.  And more often than 
not, the data are very limited, omitting important forms of total compensation (e.g. stock options 
or benefits). 
The purpose of our study is threefold.  First we build on the basic insights of principal-
agent theory, positivist agency theory, and contingency theory to derive a set of multi-level 
factors that, based on theory, should influence variable pay in broad based, organization-wide 
applications.  We focus on these three theories because each shares the basic premise that the 
use of organization-wide variable pay is related to organizational performancei.  Second, our 
data are more recent (1997-2000) and more comprehensive (e.g. includes short-term and long-
term stock options) than previously published works of broad-based variable pay and permit us 
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to consider variable pay as part of total compensation (base, bonus, and long-term incentives).  
Finally, we leverage the multi-level nature of our data, employees nested in over 100 
organizations, to gain a more precise understanding of the interactions and effects of individual 
and organizational differences on an individual’s incentive compensation. 
Principal-Agency Theory 
In the traditional application of principal-agent models, performance sensitive pay 
provides a viable solution to the problem of aligning the interests of managers with those of the 
owners of the corporations they manage (c.f. Ross, 1973;Lazear, 1979;Grossman& Hart, 1983; 
Hart and Holmstrom, 1987; Eisenhardt, 1988; Murphy, 1999).  Countless studies empirically 
support this prediction (See Murphy, 1999 for a review).  It is important to note, however, that 
these studies merely establish a significant and positive relationship between executive 
compensation and changes in firm value and not causal direction.  Few studies focus on 
whether the introduction of these incentives leads to better firm performance.  This is simply 
assumed in the theory although the few studies that have attempted to test this empirically do 
find a positive relationship between subsequent organizational performance and the proportion 
of performance contingent compensation in an organization’s pay mix (Abowd, 1990; Gerhart & 
Milkovich, 1990, Leonard, 1990; Tosi & Werner, 1995; Montemayor, 1999).  These studies, 
however, lacked data on long-term equity based incentives and only tested this relationship with 
respect short-term incentives as a proportion of pay.  Consequently, applying the same rational 
as previous studies of variable pay but expanding it to include both short-term and long-term 
incentive pay, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1a: Organizational performance is related to the use of variable pay.  Higher 
performing organizations are more likely to pay more variable compensation than poorer 
performing organizations. 
 
Before the 1990s, long term incentives were used sparingly and primarily only for senior 
executives (Abosch, 1998) consequently expanding the scope of the inquiry was not an 
empirical issue.  In the past decade, however, the practice of compensating CEOS, senior 
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executives and even managers below senior executive ranks with stock options and other forms 
of long-term incentives has risen dramatically (Abosch, 1998; Kruse et al, 2000).  Principal-
agent theory provides the rational for doing this.  Performance sensitive pay aligns the interests 
of all levels of employees with the interests of shareholders.  We therefore hypothesize that we 
should see a performance sensitive relationship applied throughout the organization. 
Hypothesis 1b: Higher performing organizations pay more variable compensation 
throughout the organization than poorer performing organizations. 
 
With the increasing size and prevalence of long term incentives, recent studies have 
shifted away from the performance contingent relationship and focused instead on 
understanding the effects of the increasing risk and the uncertainty associated with stock 
options, the typical form of long-term compensation.  In general, principal-agent theory predicts 
a negative correlation between the riskiness of firm-level performance and use of performance 
contingent pay (Garen, 1994; Samwick & Aggrwarl, 1999).  Garen found that CEO total 
compensation was negatively related to the organization’s measure of unique variance after 
controlling for variance related to the market.  Even stronger evidence is provided by Aggarwal 
& Samwick who showed that the variance in CEO and top executives’ total compensation is 
negatively related to the degree of variance in the organization’s stock returns.  Thus the larger 
the variance in total stockholder returns the lower the variability in total compensation.  Both 
these studies, however, only look at the relationship with respect to CEO and top executives 
who are likely to exert much greater influence on the organizations’ performance than managers 
below this level.   
The principal agent model does not differentiate between employee levels within the 
organization.  The main component of interest is whether and to what extent the variance in 
organizational performance influences the optimality of the pay- organization performance 
relationship.  Virtually no attention is paid to variance in individual’s risk aversion or perception 
of the riskiness of the firm’s performance.  Yet, expectancy and attribution theories (Deci, 1997; 
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Bartol and Locke, 2000) both suggest that the degree to which individuals perceive control over 
the outcome on which their rewards depend significantly influences their behaviors.  Tests of the 
principal-agent theory focus on riskiness at the firm level such as variance of the overall firm’s 
performance and variability beyond the control of the firm (Bloom & Milkovich, 1996).  However, 
other forms of risk include the instrumentality individuals perceive in the variable pay – 
performance relationship.  Arguably, below the CEO and senior executives the degree of 
uncertainty is likely to be much greater.  Hence, we expect that the relationship between 
variable pay and organization performance to be more attenuated for employees below CEO 
and senior executives within a given company.  Further, for employees within organizations with 
greater performance variability we would expect there to be an even greater attenuation as the 
employee's level within in the organization declines.  
We state our hypotheses to reflect the two levels at which we expect to see these 
relationships exhibited.  First, within organizations, we expect to see a relationship between job 
level and variable pay. 
H1c: The proportion of variable pay to base pay within an organization will vary with job 
level.  The lower the jobs level the lower the proportion of variable pay. 
 
Second, across organizations, we expect to see a negative relationship between overall 
organizational performance variability and the use variable pay, consistent with recent findings 
for CEO incentives (Garen, 1994; Samwick & Aggrwal, 1999) but for variable pay at the middle-
management level.  
H1d: Across organizations, the degree of variability in organizational performance is 
negatively related to the proportion of broad-based variable pay to base paid, even after 
controlling for individual differences within organizations on human capital and job 
attributes. 
 
Our last hypothesis captures an expected interaction between levels of analysis.  Thus, 
within organizations there is an effect of distance and less instrumentality with respect to 
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organization-wide performance and this is intensified by the degree of organization-wide 
performance variability.  We therefore assert: 
H1e: The degree of variability in organizational performance interacts with job level such 
that organizations with higher levels of performance variability will have lower variable 
pay at lower job levels. 
 
Positivist Agency Theory and Monitoring  
A major assumption in agency theory is that the employee’s actions cannot be observed 
or are costly to observe (Abowd, 1990).  This may be true under certain circumstances: non-
programmable jobs, rapid growth, disbursed ownership.  But where monitoring and observing 
actions of employees is possible, monitoring as in providing supervisors, may be less costly and 
therefore preferable to more risk prone variable compensation.  Beatty & Zajac (1995) found 
that small emerging growth firms, for example, appeared to substitute monitoring by outside 
members of the board of directors for significant non-cash incentives to its top management 
executives.  Drawing from positivist agency theory, they argued strong monitoring is appropriate 
when the benefits of monitoring outweigh the costs associated with using managerial incentives, 
particularly when incentives are only weakly tied to firm performance, which is often the case in 
highly uncertain business conditions.  Beatty & Zajac tested their propositions, however, only 
using CEO and senior executives from a sample of IPOs.  
Some work has been done on the cost versus benefits of variable pay compared to 
monitoring at levels below senior executives and CEOs (c.f.  Welbourne and Gomez-Meija 
1995).  Principal-agency theory suggests that incentive effects are diminished even more for 
managers who see firm level performance measures as extremely noisy measures of their 
individual performance.  Baker (1997) mathematically demonstrated  that the use of noisy 
measures of performance does significantly diminish incentive effects of performance contracts.  
Further, highly variable firm-level outcomes such as profitability and stock price provide very 
little information about the quantity and quality of individual managerial performance (Eisenhardt 
1989).  Consistent then with theory, we would expect that below the senior executive ranks, 
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greater monitoring through levels of managerial oversight would be more effective in eliciting 
superior behavior than simply aligning interests through outcome-based compensation.  Rather 
than oversight from a governance structure, however, oversight resides in the organizational 
structure.  Managerial hierarchy, a device particular to organizations as opposed to external 
markets(Williamson 1981), is effectively used for monitoring and controlling behavior.  In larger 
bureaucratic organizations where there is a managerial infrastructure to support greater 
monitoring and less need to deploy higher cost incentives, it likely that use of performance-
based incentives is less efficient than simply monitoring performance and rewarding greater 
effort with short-term individually based increases to base pay such as merit increases.  We 
therefore predict based on this theoretical perspective: 
H2a: The greater the levels of firm monitoring, as represented by levels of management 
between the manager and CEO and size, the smaller the proportions of variable to base 
pay. 
 
While the Board of Directors may closely monitor the CEO and top managers, not all 
jobs below this level may be easily monitored.  In the case of especially skilled positions that are 
not as programmable or where productivity is not easily evaluated, observation of behavior is 
not a reliable indicator of performance (Eisenhardt 1989).  For example, R& D jobs compared to 
general management positions may not be as easily monitored.  In this case out-come based 
measures are warranted and are less costly and more effective than monitoring.  As a 
consequence, the type of job may also bear on whether monitoring is as effective as incentives. 
H2b: Middle managers in technical jobs are more likely to exhibit a greater level of 
variable to base pay compared to other middle managers. 
 
Managers in smaller firms, with fewer levels of management, are likely to have a closer 
line of sight than managers in much larger firms and are likely to have more influence on 
outcomes than larger firms.  Thus in addition to number of layers of management and types of 
jobs, the size of the organization should influence the efficacy of incentive compensation.  
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Individuals in larger organizations may perceive they have less individual effect on 
organizational outcomes, which may also encourage free riding.  Thus we expect: 
H2c Across organizations, large organizations will exhibit a lower proportion of variable 
pay to base pay than small organizations, controlling for within organization differences 
in human capital and job characteristics. 
 
STRATEGIC CONTINGENCY THEORY 
In addition to uncertainty and organizational bureaucracy, business strategy also 
influences both compensation design and organizational performance.  Strategic contingency 
theory holds that firm performance is based upon the alignment of an organization’s 
compensation systems and business strategies (Milkovich 1988; Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 
1992).  Gerhart & Milkovich (1992) analyses of a multi-industry sample of public companies over 
a 5-year period from 1980 to 1985, provided some indirect empirical support for this theory, 
finding that organizational differences in pay mix practices explained an additional 20-35% 
variance in compensation even after controlling for factors such as industry, size and profitability 
and differences human capital.  However, they did not directly measure business strategy.  
Building on these results, using a more recent cross-sectional sample of multi-industry firms, 
Montemayor (1996) linked specific business-level strategies to specific types of compensation 
strategies identified in the strategic human resource literature.  In partial support of the 
underlying contingency framework, Montemayor reported that higher performing firms had 
specific compensation strategies and that these distinguished them from lesser performing 
firms.  The basic premise of this research is that certain combinations (or “bundles”) of 
compensation policies better support the firm’s strategic business objectives.  
One particular strategy that has gained currency in the nineties is the risk sharing 
formula characterized by below market base pay levels offset with a premium of higher variable 
pay such as stock options (Chingos 1997).  From a strategic perspective, such a risk sharing 
strategy might both improve earnings and lower earnings variability because it lowers an 
organization’s fixed compensation costs.  If sales volumes vary significantly, the bottom line is 
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less affected because compensation costs vary as well.  Thus for emerging firms in relatively 
new and untested product markets, this is an appealing design.  Low fixed costs along with 
variable pay to increase/ reward employee effort.  Also a risk sharing strategy is consistent with 
firms emphasizing cost efficiencies as the basis of competitive positioning with their industry 
(Porter 1985).  Thus based on this pay contingency line of reasoning, we predict: 
H3: Emerging growth firms will have compensation characterized by a high proportion of 
variable pay to base pay compared to other firms. 
 
Integrating Principal Agent and Strategic Contingency Theories 
In general, principal agent theory predicts that greater incentive compensation reduces 
agency costs by aligning executive interests with the interests of shareholders.  A risk sharing 
strategy seems to be justified, at least on these grounds, in the business press.  On the other 
hand, principal agent theory also specifies a risk- return trade-off.  In cases where the firm’s 
earnings are highly variable, a higher proportion of variable pay may not be optimal because as 
discussed earlier, theory and evidence suggests too much uncertainty can offset the incentive 
effect.  Too much uncertainty associated with the realization of outcome-based incentives can 
cause agents to reduce effort or to take costly actions designed to reduce the variability of their 
pay (Bloom & Milkovich, 1996; Werner & Tosi, 1995; Eisenhardt, 1989).  Bloom & Milkovich 
(1996) study of compensation design in large Fortune 500 companies in the mid eighties, found 
evidence suggesting that organizations with higher levels of organizational risk and greater use 
of incentive pay also had lower shareholder returns. 
Risk sharing strategies have often been coupled with a strategy of smaller emerging 
firms who have limited current resources but whose future earning is premised on business 
strategy for growth (Chingos 1997).  A hallmark of these firms however is the variability of 
performance and therefore principal agent theory would predict that these firms should use less 
variable pay.  From a contingent strategic perspective, Montemayor theorized that these kinds 
of organizations, he labels innovators, should evidence supportive compensation policies that 
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comprise both high base pay and high variable pay.  Total compensation would indeed be 
higher with these firms, but with less earnings risk to the employee.  This combination of high 
total compensation comprised of above average base pay and an opportunity to share in the 
profits of the firm are also characteristics of the best practice compensation strategy described 
by others (Huselid 1995; Pfeffer and Veiga 1999) that are based on the resourced-based view 
of the firm (Barney 1991).  Thus when the predictions of both principal agent theory and the 
strategic - contingent view of the firm are combined, we predict an alternate compensation 
design to the one based on competitive strategy alone.  
H4: Emerging growth firms are less likely to have a high proportion of variable pay to 
base salary than older established firms. 
 
Monitoring and Business Strategy 
Beatty & Zajac (1994) reported that board monitoring clearly replaced incentives as the 
preferred compensation strategy for CEOs in a sample of IPOs.  However, for individuals below 
this level the dynamics of monitoring, incentive instrumentalities and individual motivation may 
vary.  While emerging growth organizations may use greater monitoring as a means to offset 
the incentive risk trade-off, there are other aspects of organizational structure and individual 
motivation that may moderate efficacy of these factors.  Employees in smaller firms with fewer 
organization levels are likely to have a closer line of sight than individuals in much larger 
organizations and are likely to have more influence on outcomes than larger organizations.  
Furthermore, while the board may closely monitor the CEO and top managers, not all jobs 
below this level may be easily monitored.  Certain especially skilled positions may not be as 
programmable or easily monitored (Eisenhardt 1989).  For example, in highly sophisticated R & 
D jobs observable behaviors are not easily specified.  Further, in emerging firms whose strategy 
for success is based on innovation, R& D jobs are highly important.  As a consequence, in 
addition to the level of monitoring associated with the job type, the type of business strategy 
should also affect compensation design. 
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H5: Organizational strategy moderates the proportion of variable pay to base pay such 
that those managers in highly technical jobs in emerging growth organizations will exhibit 
greater levels of variable pay to base pay compared to companies pursuing different 
organizational level strategies. 
 
METHODS 
Sample 
To test these propositions, we use compensation and performance data from a 
population of high technology firms.  These organizations include large well-established 
organizations as well as newer emerging growth firms.  Data for the study come from four 
archival data sources.  Total compensation data are drawn from the Clark/Bardes, formerly 
known as Executive Alliance SC/ChiPS, annual compensation surveys of over 140 high 
technology companies over a four-year period, 1997 through 2000.  The database contains 
company pay policy data, individual pay, job and demographic information for a sample of 
managers from each participating company.  The individual pay information includes base 
salary, short-term incentives, equity-based compensation incentives, job level, and job family.  
These data are also merged with financial accounting data drawn from COMPUSTAT data files 
and other information are gathered from the CD Disclosure database and SEC filings on Edgar.  
The final sample consists of 104 organizations for which we had complete information.  We 
tested this final sample against the original sample to see if there were significant differences in 
average variable compensation, profitability and size and found no significant biases. 
Measures 
Individual Level Measures 
Base salary represents an employee’s annual salary as of April 1, 1997 and 2000. 
Variable compensation includes both short and long term incentives.  The value of short-
term incentives is equal to the actual gross awards distributed during the prior 12-month period 
ending April 1, 1997 and April 1,2000.  Short-term incentives include all cash awards related to 
annual corporate, division, unit or individual performance and profit sharing payments.  In 
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addition to cash awards, the values of stock grants and restricted stock awards with vesting 
schedules of less than one year are included in the value of short-term incentives.  These stock 
values represent the face value of the stock at grant (i.e. the fair market value of the stock 
multiplied by the number of shares granted.).  Long term incentives include individual valuations 
of incentive stock options, non-qualified stock options, stock appreciation rights, restricted stock 
awards with more than one year vesting, performance units and performance shares.  All 
valuations reflect the dollar amount an investor would deem equivalent to the value of the 
award, considering the expected future price of the stock, the time value of money, and the 
associated risk.  For options, the Black-Scholes Option pricing model is used.  Long-term 
incentive valuations are also adjusted to reflect the frequency of grants. 
Tenure is the reported years of service of the employee as of April 1 of the reporting 
year. 
Level represents the degree of responsibility, task complexity, education and years of 
work experience required for a job.  There are five levels of jobs for individual contributors, jobs 
where there are not supervisory responsibilities and three levels of managers.  Higher levels of 
manager represent responsibility for increasing number of employees and cross-functional 
representation. 
Job Type describes the primary nature of the work.  There is three job types: research 
and development (R& D), technical and non-technical.  Job Type is coded as a dummy where 1 
equals research and development and 0 indicates the remaining two categories. 
Company Level Measures 
Organizational performance is measured as return on average assets (Abowd 1990; 
Gerhart and Milkovich 1990; Montemayor 1996) and represents the profit before interest and 
taxes that the organization derives from managing its business assets.  It is derived from 
COMPUSTAT data for the fiscal year ended prior to April 1 of the year in which the 
compensation data are collected, in this case for fiscal years ended 1996 and 1999, and 
Organization-wide Broad-based Incentives: CAHRS WP02-05 
 
 
Page 16 
calculated by dividing operating profit after depreciation by the average of beginning and ending 
fiscal year total assets.  
Size of the company is measured by the total assets of the company.  There are several 
acceptable measures of size including number of employees and total sales.  All three 
measures are highly correlated.  We chose total assets for parsimony.  The results do not vary if 
other measures are used. 
Organizational risk is measured as the coefficient of variation for return on shareholder 
equity.  The coefficient of variation standardizes variation units across firms of all sizes and is 
calculated by dividing the standard deviation of return on shareholder equity as measured by 
Compustat over a minimum of a three year period by the mean of return on shareholder equity 
over the same period.  We use the coefficient of variation of return on shareholder equity as a 
measure of variation in firm level performance (Gerhart and Trevor 1996) and the extent to 
which environmental uncertainty impacts firm performance (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997) 
in addition to managerial strategic decisions and actions (Ruefli, Collins et al.  1999).  This 
measure of risk was selected from a review of risk studies that summarizes recent 
methodological findings and identifies coefficient of variation of company level return on 
investment ratios as one that is more consistent with an understanding of risk from a strategic 
management perspective than measures taken from financial economics based on capital asset 
pricing theory (Ruefli, Collins et al.  1999).  
Organizational strategy is based on a content analysis of the firm’s description of their 
business, competition and marketing strategies described in the organizations 10-K filing for the 
fiscal years ended in 1996 and 1999, the performance years represented in the study sample.  
Four subject matter experts read through these descriptions and indicated whether they thought 
the organization’s goals and objectives could be characterized as shrinking, retrenching, 
focused on stabilized incremental growth or aggressive growth (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992).  
To insure reliability of these assessments the assessments of all four-subject experts were 
analyzed for consistency.  Inter-rater reliability on a sample of 8 10-K evaluations was assessed 
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after each rater was trained how to complete a standardized evaluation form.  Inter-rater 
reliability for this sample was .75.  Each of the four possible organizational-level strategies were 
then coded as dummy variables. 
Age is the number of fiscal years in operation from the date of incorporation. 
Year is a control indicator variable representing the fiscal year for which the financial 
data are reported.  In this case it is 1996 and 1999.  
Hierarchical Linear Model Specification 
To analyze our data, we use a hierarchical linear model (HLM), adopting a two level 
approach (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992) where the level- 1 model (employees) is estimated 
separately for each company (level-2).  Bryk & Raudenbush (1992) summarize the 
methodological advantages of using HLM for multi-level data as capturing the best features of 
individual (level-1) and company (level-2) analyses, “It provides unbiased and efficient estimates 
of the fixed effects, which are more closely approximated by the Level-1 analysis, and provides 
proper standard error estimates, regardless of the degree of within- unit clustering, that are 
more closely approximated by the Level-2 analysis (p.84).” A second advantage of using HLM is 
that it allows for a proper examination of heterogeneity both between individuals within an 
organization and heterogeneity across organizations.  With HLM we can manage this empirical 
issue appropriately by recognizing the effects of both individual-level and organizational-level on 
the dependent variable.  HLM enables us to estimate a separate set of regression coefficients 
for each organization and then to model variation among organizations in their sets of 
coefficients as multivariate outcomes to be explained by organizational factors (Bryk & 
Raudenbush, 1992). 
Statistical Multi-level Model 
Our model of these three theories involve studying both individual and organizational 
differences and takes a multi-level form, where on one level, level-1, we study individual 
differences within organizations and our dependent variable is at the individual level: 
Level-1: γij = β0j + βnjXnij + rij 
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Where γij is the outcome measure for each individual.  In this analysis γij represents the 
proportion of variable pay to base pay, measured as short variable pay to base pay, long-term 
variable pay to base pay, and total variable pay to base pay for individual i in company j, Xnij is a 
matrix of independent variables representing human capital and job attributes in company j, β0, 
and βnj and are intercepts and slopes estimated separately for each company and rij is the 
residual representing the remaining unexplained variation across individuals in the sample of 
companies.  
On the second level, the effect that the company differences exert on the individual 
model is captured as follows: 
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ0kGkj + U0j 
  βnj = γn0 + γnkGkj + Unj  
 
 
where Gj are the company level variables, and β0j are intercepts and slopes relating 
company level variables to the intercept, β0j and slope terms, βnj, from the level –1 equation and 
U0j and U1j are the level –2 residuals (Hoffman 1997). 
To test hypotheses 1c and 2b we specify basic level-1 ordinary least squares regression 
with random coefficients and robust error estimation:  
LTIij = β0j + β1j(Tenureij) + β2j(Typeij) + β3j(Levelij) + rij 
STIij = β0j + β1j(Tenureij) + β2j(Typeij) + β3j(Levelij) + rij 
 
Where LTIij is the individual level outcome, measure the proportion of long-term incentive 
to base salary for individual i in company j, and STIij the proportion of short-term incentive to 
base salary.  Tenure, Job type, and Job level are independent values centered on their grand 
mean for each individual in the sample.  β
 0, β1j, β2j and β3j are random intercepts and slopes 
estimated separately for each company and rij is the robust error residual for individual i in 
company j.  
For the remaining hypotheses we test multi-level effects, using company level variables 
to examine the effects of company-level variables on individual-level outcomes: The effect that 
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the company variables exert on the individual-level model is captured in the level-2 model where 
estimated Level-1 intercept, β0, and slopes, β1j, β2j and β3j, are level –2 outcome variables. 
Level-1: 
LTIij = β0j + β1j (Tenureij) + β2j (Typeij) + β3j (Levelij) + rij 
STIij = β0j + β1j (Tenureij) + β2j (Typeij) + β3j (Levelij) + rij 
Level-2:  
β0j = γ00 + γ01 (Organizational performance) + γ02 (Organizational risk) + γ03 (Size) + γ04 
(Age)+ γ05 (Organizational strategy) + γ06 (Age * Organizational strategy) + U0j 
β1j = γ10 + U1j 
β2j = γ20 + γ21 (Age) + γ22 (Organizational strategy) + γ23 (Age * Organizational Strategy) + 
U2j 
β3j = γ30 + γ31 (Organizational performance) + γ32 (Organizational risk) + γ33 (Size)+ U3j 
  
 
Where organizational risk, size, and organizational strategy are company level 
measures, γ00, γ01, γ02, γ03, γ04 and γ05 are level-2 fixed effect intercept terms, γ10, γ20, γ21, γ22, γ30, 
γ31, γ32 and γ33 are fixed effect slopes relating company level variables to the intercept and slope 
terms from the level-1 equation, and U0j, Unj, U2j and U3j, are level-2 residuals. 
The expected results for each hypothesis using this multi-level model are summarized 
on Table 1.  
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RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics of the combined sample are shown on Table 2.  The average 
employee in this sample earned approximately 10 percent of their base pay as short-term 
variable pay, although there was wide variation from no short-term pay to almost four times 
base pay.  These extremes were even more pronounced for long-term variable pay.  On 
average the long-term incentive compensation in this sample represented a little less than one 
third of a manager’s base pay, however this masks wide variation across individuals and firms.  
While some individuals received no long-term incentives others received over 50 times their 
base pay in long-term variable pay.  About 84 percent of individuals worked for growth 
companies that had been in business for about 35 years.  About 43 percent of the sample 
consisted of individuals holding positions in research and development.  The results of our multi-
level analyses appear on Table 3 for short-term variable pay, table 4 for long-term variable pay.  
In the first five hypotheses, we examined the extent to which principal-agent theory 
alone explained variation in the use of broad-based variable pay practices within and across 
organizations.  Hypothesis 1a stated that higher performing organizations would use variable 
pay more than poorer performers.  This hypothesis was supported for both short-term bonuses 
and long-term incentives.  As shown on table 3, variation in organizational performance was 
positively related to average bonus pay (γ01 = .0011 p < .01) and on table 4, the same significant 
relationship is indicated for long-term incentives (γ01 = .0059 p < .01).  In hypothesis 1b we 
expected that the same incentive principles explaining variation across organizations would 
apply at all levels within the organization.  Thus we asserted that higher performing firms would 
have higher short and long-term incentives than lower performers at all job levels.  We found no 
support for hypothesis 1b for either short or long-term variable pay.  In fact, our results suggest 
individuals in lower levels of higher performing organizations earn less in long-term incentives 
(γ31 = - .0019 p < .001) than lower performing organizations.  In hypothesis 1c, we asserted that 
variable pay would decline with job level because individuals in these positions would have less 
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instrumentality in affecting performance-based variable pay.  Our results confirm this hypothesis 
for both types of variable pay.  On table 3, γ30, which measures the individual level relationship 
between, employee short-term variable pay and the number of levels the employee's job is from 
the executive management, is significantly negative (γ30 =  - .0129 p < .001) and on table 4, for 
long-term variable pay (γ30 =  - .077 p < .001).  Hypothesis 1d stated that there should be a 
negative relationship between performance risk and use of variable pay at the organizational 
level.  We found no support for hypothesis 1d.  On table 4, for long-term incentives, the 
relationship was negative, as predicted but not significant, and on table 3, for short-term variable 
pay the relationship was significantly positive (γ02 = .0001 p < .001), the opposite of what 
principal-agent theory would predict.  Finally, in hypothesis 1e, we expected that performance 
risk would moderate the degree to which variable pay is used on a broad basis.  Thus we 
expected that organizations with higher performance risk would use less variable pay at lower 
levels.  The data support hypothesis 1e with respect to short-term variable pay shown on table 3 
(γ32 = - .00004 p < .01) but as shown on table 4, γ31 for long-term variable pay is not significantly 
different from zero.  Variance in shareholders' return on equity does not appear to affect 
differences in the use of long-term incentives for lower levels across organizations. 
Three hypotheses based on positivist agency theory focus on the substitution of 
managerial oversight for the use of variable pay as an incentive alignment device.  Our results 
support hypothesis 2a, which states that there will be a negative relationship between levels of 
monitoring and variable pay.  The level-1 coefficient, β3, measuring the relationship between 
variable pay and number of levels away from the executive level was significantly positive for 
short and long-term variable pay, the same as is predicted under hypothesis 1a based on 
principal-agent theory.  However, more robust results are obtained for positivist theory because 
the level-2 coefficient, γ33, measuring variation in this relationship across organizations of 
different size also supports hypothesis 2a.  On table 3, reporting the results for short-term 
variable pay, γ33 is negative and significant (γ33 =  - .0000001 p < .05) and on table 4 for long-
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term variable pay, γ33 is negative and significant (γ33 = - .0000001 p < .05).  Larger organizations 
pay lower variable compensation at lower levels within their organizations than smaller 
organizations.  Hypothesis 2b tests whether certain job attributes, which are hard to monitor are 
associated with higher variable pay.  Our results support hypothesis 2b.  Individuals in R & D 
jobs received a significantly higher proportion of their base pay as variable pay, an average of 
about 6 percentage points higher in total variable pay.  In general, however, hypothesis 2c, 
which asserted that larger organizations would use variable pay less than smaller organizations, 
was not supported.  Instead, our results suggest the opposite, that larger organizations on 
average pay more in short-term and total variable pay (γ3 = .00001 p < .01).  
Our last three hypotheses looked at the influence of contingency theory and integration 
with the two neoclassic economic theories.  In hypothesis 3, we asserted that emerging growth 
companies would have a larger proportion variable pay than those of older age and other 
strategies.  Our results provide no support for this assertion.  There is no variation in average 
variable pay, either short or long-term, across organizations of younger age, those with an 
organizational strategy focused on growth or the intersection of these two.  We also found no 
evidence in support of hypothesis 4, which posed the opposite assertion.  While the 
relationships were not significant for either hypothesis, the signs of the coefficients for age and 
the interaction term provided greater support for hypothesis 3, which suggests that younger 
growing companies are also more likely to have riskier earnings and also share this risk more 
with employees by having higher variable pay.  Note, however, these results are not significant. 
Finally, we looked at whether organization strategy moderates the proportion of variable 
compensation paid to those in more technical positions.  Our results here are mixed.  We find 
that younger companies appear to pay their R& D managers higher short-term and long-term 
incentives but the relationship is significant only for short-term incentives.  The effect is also 
very weak.  Each 10-year difference in company age amounted to about a .75 percentage point 
difference in total variable pay to base compensation. 
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DISCUSSION 
The growth of broad-based incentive compensation is a notable trend in compensation 
design.  We used three rational theories, principal-agency, positivist agency and contingency 
theories, to identify which factors might influence the use of broad-based variable pay and 
applied a multi-level lens to consider jointly both individual and organizational-level variables.  At 
the individual level we identified two factors: type of job and level within the bureaucracy.  At the 
organizational level, there were four factors: performance, risk, size, and strategy.  Our results 
indicate that total variance in variable pay is split between individual-level factors, 30% for short-
term and 33% for long-term, and organizational factors, 70% for short-term and 67% for long-
term.  However, we found empirically, that alone and combined that these factors, derived from 
these three theories, and tested on a sample of organizations that reputably have been the most 
aggressive in deploying this growing compensation practice, provided limited explanation for the 
variation within and across organizations particularly for long-term incentives.  
In support of principal-agent theory we found organizational performance and broad-
based variable pay were positively related, which affirms that higher performing organizations 
do pay higher incentives than lower performing organizations.  However, if we investigate 
further, this relationship does not hold at lower levels within the organizations.  In fact our results 
suggest that higher performing organizations pay less variable pay at lower levels within their 
organizations.  These results may reflect greater risk faced by individuals at lower levels, also 
consistent with principal-agent theory.  
When we then considered the effect of organizational risk, our results indicated 
performance risk had no significant effect on the use of long-term incentives, either in explaining 
variation in use of broad-based long-term incentives across companies generally or variation in 
its deployment to lower levels across different organization.  Hence these results provide little 
support for the expectation, based on principal-agent theory, that organizations with greater 
performance risk rely less on incentives because of the cost of risk shifting.  In fact, we found 
higher risk organizations used more short-term variable pay and not less.  There was no 
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significant difference among higher risk organizations in their use of long-term incentives.  To 
investigate this further, we ran the analysis again, controlling for level of base pay, thinking 
higher base pay might mitigate overall risk of an individual’s compensation.  In this case, we 
found the expected relationship for long-term pay.  That is for more risky organizations, long-
term incentives were used significantly less on average.  These mixed results raise the question 
about whether the same factors that explain the use of variable pay at the CEO and senior 
executive level, based on principal-agent theory, apply for broad-based variable compensation.  
Further research is warranted to determine whether factors other than risk influence the use of 
broad-based incentivesii.  
With respect to positivist theory, our results are more convincing.  We found that larger 
organizations substitute greater supervision for incentive pay at lower levels in the 
organizations.  Our results also showed that larger organizations used less variable 
compensation at lower levels than smaller organizations.  This again supports positivist theory.  
Direct managerial oversight replaced riskier variable pay as the preferred mechanism for 
reducing agency costs.  But we also found that larger companies offset this practice by paying 
out a higher proportion of short-term variable pay on average, compared to other organizations.  
In addition, our results indicated that for complex, less programmable jobs incentive alignment 
replaced monitoring (Eisenhardt, 1989) as asserted in hypothesis 2b.   
Our tests of contingency theory and variable compensation design provided the least 
explanatory power.  While, we found no significant evidence in support of a combined 
contingency / principal-agency perspective, our results did indicate younger growing companies 
appear to rely more on variable pay than other organizations in the sample.  While these results 
were not robust, it is possible with a greater sample of firms these results may yield significant 
results, therefore further research is merited.  We also looked at whether organization strategy 
moderates the proportion of variable compensation paid to those in more complex but strategic 
positions.  While we found that younger companies appear to pay their R& D managers higher 
short-term incentives the difference was relatively inconsequential.  Each 10-year difference in 
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company age amounted to a difference of about a .2 percentage point in bonus pay to base 
compensation. 
In sum, theory tells us that the use of broad-based variable pay should be influenced by 
both individual and organizational factors.  At the individual level, type of job and level within the 
hierarchy are two factors and at the organizational level, performance, risk, size, and strategy.  
Empirically we find individual-level factors are important.  Both type of job and level within the 
organization significantly influence the amount of short and long-term variable pay an individual 
earns.  At the organizational level, for short-term incentives, performance, risk, size, and 
strategy all influenced the application of short-term incentives.  In contrast, only organizational 
performance explained differences across firms in the use of stock options as long-term variable 
compensation, and not risk or organizational strategy as rational theories predict. 
These results have implications for whether researchers can use rationally based theory 
to adequately explain compensation design.  These theories are based on the premise that 
maximization of shareholder profits is the primary driver of compensation strategy and design.  
Our results suggest there are other factors to consider.  Other theories that challenge the notion 
of rational wealth maximization behavior and monolithic aligned goals may provide another 
avenue for explaining current compensation practices.  For example, broad-based incentive 
compensation practices may be adopted by organizations not simply to encourage goal 
alignment but to respond to the competitive actions of others, to comply with coercive 
suggestions of industry consultants, or simply to copy "best practices" (Scott 1992; Levine 1993; 
Scott 1995; Gerhart, Trevor et al.  1996).  These factors suggest that institutional theory may 
better explain current behavior.  Resource-dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Pfeffer 
1990) and managerial power (Lambert, Larker et al.  1993; Werner and Tosi 1995) theories may 
also shed light on what accounts for the significant variance within and across organizations in 
the use of organization-wide variable pay. 
From a practical perspective, these results suggest that managers should critically 
examine the reasons for engaging in these "innovative" compensation practices.  The reality is 
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that the performance-based rhetoric used to support these practices is not a complete 
explanation.  Additional factors such as responding to competitors’ practices in order to attract 
and retain people, following the latest trends regardless of any payoffs or maintaining internal 
equity may also explain the use of incentive plans.  
Conclusion 
Each theoretical perspective on its own gives limited insight into the variable 
compensation organization - performance relationship.  Further research using theories that are 
institutionally and politically based may provide additional insight.  Rational theory alone does 
not appear to explain the significant variation in use of short-term and long-term broad based 
incentives observed in practice.  
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Table 1 Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Individual-Level Level-1 Company-Level Level-2 
H1a: Organizational performance is related to the use of variable pay.  Higher performing 
organizations are more likely to pay more variable compensation than poorer performing 
organizations. 
Average 
variable pay ß0jj>0 
Organizational 
Performance γ01>0 
H1b: Higher performing organizations are will to pay more variable compensation throughout 
the organization than poorer performing organizations. Job level ß3j 
Organizational 
Performance γ31>0 
H1c: The proportion of variable pay to base pay will be positively related to job level.  Job level ß3j<0 NA NA 
H1d: The degree of variability in organizational performance will be negatively related to the 
proportion of variable pay to base pay, net of variations due to differences in job level. 
Average 
variable pay ß0j>0 Organizational Risk γ02<0 
H1e: The degree of variability in organizational performance moderates the effect of job level 
on the proportion of variable pay to base pay such that for organizations with higher levels of 
performance variability, the relationship between job level and variable pay to base will be 
lower than for organizations with low levels of performance variability 
Job Level ß3j Organizational Risk γ32<0 
Positivist Agency Theory:     
H2a: The greater the levels of firm monitoring the smaller the proportion of variable pay to 
base pay Job level ß3j<0 
Organizational 
Size γ33<0 
H2b: Individuals in technical jobs are more likely to have greater proportions of variable pay 
to base pay compared to non-technical jobs Job Type ß2j>0 NA NA 
H2c: Large companies will have lower proportions of variable pay to base pay than smaller 
companies 
Average 
variable pay ß0j 
Organizational 
Size γ03<0 
 
Contingency Theory: Individual-Level 
Level-1 
Coefficient Company-Level Level-2 Coefficient 
H3: Individuals in young growth companies will have compensation 
characterized by a high proportion of variable pay to base compared to 
other companies 
Average 
variable pay ß0j 
Age, Organizational 
strategy, and 
Age x Organizational 
strategy 
γ04<0 
γ05>0 
γ06<0 
H4: Young growth companies are less likely to have higher variable pay 
than other companies 
Average 
variable pay ß0j 
Age, Organizational 
strategy, and 
Age x Organizational 
strategy 
γ04>0 
γ05<0 
γ06>0 
H5: Organizational strategy moderates the proportion of variable pay such 
that those managers in technical positions in young growth companies will 
exhibit higher variable pay compared to other companies 
Job Type ß2j 
Age, Organizational 
strategy, and 
Age x Organizational 
strategy 
γ21<0 
γ22>0 
v23<0 
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Table 2 
Means and Correlations 
 
 
 
 
SD
Job type
Size
Short-term variable
Long-term variable
Tenure
Job Level
Organizational 
Performance
Organizational risk
Age
Organizational 
Age x Org strategy
Mean
0.101
0.282
9.610
0.431
4.413
15.070
0.780
35,619
44.61
0.843
35.60
0.114
0.605
8.750
0.495
1.620
10.580
7.700
39,917
34.40
0.3630
34.34
0.347
0.079
0.004
-0.280
0.337
-0.002
0.208
0.035
0.175
0.119
-0.121
0.086
-0.260
0.286
0.000
-0.049
-0.180
0.093
-0.096
-0.080
-0.240
-0.182
-0.010
0.163
0.217
-0.050
0.108
-0.004
0.027
0.004
-0.090
-0.090
0.015
-0.050
0.069
-0.010
-0.002
-0.020
0.060
0.030
0.003
-0.032
-0.243
0.226
-0.166
0.010
-0.030
-0.060
-0.030
0.620
0.240
0.710
-0.170
0.730 0.450
Correlations significant at p<.05 for all values >.01 for N=398,239
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Table 3 
Hierarchical Linear Model 
Regression on Short-term Bonus Pay 
 
 
 
 
Fixed Effect 
Coefficient  a s.e  b 
Fixed Effect 
Coefficient  a s.e  b 
Short-term variable to base pay intercept β0 
   Base γ00  0.068 0.0067 *** 0.06504 0.0067 *** 
   Organizational Performance γ01  0.00111 0.0004 ** 
   Organizational risk  γ02  0.00010 0.0001 * 
   Size γ03 0.00000 0.0000 ** 
   Age γ04 -0.00005 0.0003 
   Organizational strategy γ05  0.00192 0.0115 
   Age x Organizational strategy γ06 0.00013 0.0003 
Tenure β1 
   Base γ10 0.002 0.0004 *** 0.00174 0.0004 *** 
Technical job type β2 
   Base γ20 0.004 0.0027 * 0.00449 0.0027 * 
   Age γ21 -0.00021 0.0001 * 
   Organizational strategy γ23 -0.00537 0.0086 
   Age x Organizational strategy γ24 0.00000 0.0001 
Number of Hierarchical level β3 
   Base  γ30 -0.013 0.0015 *** -0.01289 0.0015 *** 
   Performance γ31 -0.00022 0.0001 
   Performance risk γ32 -0.00004 0.0000 * 
   Size γ33 -0.00000 0.0000 * 
   %  Individual-level variance 48% 
   %  
 Organization-level 18% 
a  Variables centered on their grand mean 
b  Robust standard errors 
* p < .05  ** p  <.01 *** P < .001 one-sided tails 
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Table 4 
Hierarchical Linear Model 
Regression on Long-term Incentive Pay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed Effect 
Coefficient  a s.e  b 
Fixed Effect 
Coefficient  a s.e  b 
Short-term variable to base pay intercept β0 
   Base γ00  0.225 0.0390 *** 0.213213 0.0355  ***
   Organizational Performance γ01  0.005880 0.0023  ** 
   Organizational risk  γ02   -0.000248 0.0002 
   Size γ03 0.000001 0.0000 
   Age γ04 -0.000256 0.0004 
   Organizational strategy γ05  0.029248 0.0319 
   Age x Organizational strategy γ06   -0.000472 0.0006 
Tenure β1 
   Base γ10 0.000 0.0021   -0.0000724 0.0021 
Technical job type β2 
   Base γ20 0.061 0.0133 *** 0.060986 0.0133  ***
   Age γ21 -0.000276 0.0005 
   Organizational strategy γ23 -0.023384 0.0449 
   Age x Organizational strategy γ24 0.000136 0.0006 
Number of Hierarchical level β3 
   Base  γ30 -0.077 0.0104 *** -0.076507 0.0099 *** 
   Performance γ31 -0.001918 0.0006 *** 
   Performance risk γ32  0.000050 0.0001 
   Size γ33 -0.000001 0.0000 * 
   %  Individual-level variance 32% 
   %  
 Organization-level   7% 
a  Variables centered on their grand mean 
b  Robust standard errors 
* p < .05  ** p  <.01 *** P < .001 one-sided tails 
Organization-wide Broad-based Incentives: CAHRS WP02-05 
 
 
Page 31 
References 
 
Abosch, K.  S. (1998). “Variable Pay: Do We Have the Basics in Place?” Compensation and 
Benefits Review: 12-22. 
Abowd, J. (1990). “Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Corporate 
Performance.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43S: 52-73. 
Aggarwal, R.K., & Samwick, A.A. (1999).  the Other Side of the Trade-off:  The Impact of Risk 
on Executive Compensation.  Journal of Political Economy, 107(1), 65-105. 
Anderson, M.  C., R.  D.  Banker, et al. (2000). “Executive Compensation in the Information 
Technology Industry.” Management Science 46(4): 530-547. 
Baker, G., R.  Gibbons, et al. (1997).  Implicit contracts and the theory of the firm.  Cornell 
University.  Ithaca. 
Barney, J. (1991). “Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage.” Journal of 
Management 17(1): 99-120. 
Bartol, K.  M., & Locke, E.  A. (2000).  Incentives and Motivation.  In S.L..  Rynes & B.  Gerhart 
(Eds.), Compensation in Organizations (pp.  104-150).  San Francisco:  Jossey-Bass. 
Beatty, R.P., & Zajac, E.J. (1994).  Managerial incentives, monitoring, and risk bearing:  a study 
of executive compensation, ownership, and board structure in initial public offerings.  
Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(2), 313-356. 
Bloom, M., & Milkovich, G.  T. (1998).  The relationship between risk, incentive pay, and 
organizational performance.  Academy of Management Journal, 41(3), 283-297. 
Boyd, B.  K., & Salamin, A. (2001).  Strategic Reward Systems:  a Contingency Model of Pay 
System Design.  Strategic Management Journal, 22, 777-792. 
Bryk, A.  S.  and S.  W.  Raudenbush (1992).  Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and 
Data Analysis Methods.  Newbury Park. 
Chingos, P.  T., Ed. (1997).  Paying for Performance: A Guide to Compensation Management.  
New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Eisenhardt, K.  M. (1989). “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review.” Academy of 
Management Review 14(1): 57-74. 
Finkelstein, S.  and B.  K.  Boyd (1998). “How much does the CEO matter? The role of 
managerial discretion in the setting of CEO compensation.” Academy of Management 
Journal 41(2): 179-218. 
Garen, J.  E. (1994).  Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory.  Journal of Political 
Economy, 102(6), 11775-1199. 
Gerhart, B.  and G.  Milkovich (1990). “Organizational differences in managerial compensation 
and financial performance.” Academy of Management Journal 33: 663-691. 
Gerhart, B.  and C.  Trevor (1996). “Employment Variability Under Different Compensation 
Systems.” Academy of Management Journal 39: 1692-1712. 
Gerhart, B., C.  Trevor, et al. (1996). “New Directions in Compensation Research: synergies, 
Risk, and Survival.” Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management 14: 
143-203. 
Gomez-Mejia, L.  and R.  M.  Wiseman (1997). “Reframing Executive Compensation: An 
Assessment and Outlook.” Journal of Management 23(3): 291-374. 
Gomez-Mejia, L.  R.  and D.  B.  Balkin (1992).  Compensation, Organizational Strategy, and 
Firm Performance.  Cincinnati, South-Western Publishing Co. 
Gray, S., & Jr., A.  A.  C. (1997).  The role of risk in executive compensation.  Journal of 
Management, 23(4), 517-541. 
Grossman, S., & Hart, O. (1983).  an Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem.  Econometrica, 
51, -35. 
Hall, B., & Murphy, K.  J. (2000).  Stock Options for Undiversified Executives.  Unpublished 
Negotiation, Organizations and Markets Research Paper 00-01, Harvard University, 
Cambridge. 
Organization-wide Broad-based Incentives: CAHRS WP02-05 
 
 
Page 32 
Hoffman, D.  A. (1997). “Hierarchical Linear Models.” Journal of Management 23(6): 723-744. 
Huselid, M.  A. (1995). “The Impact of Human Resource Management Practices on Turnover, 
Productivity, and Corporate Financial Performance.” Academy of Management Journal 
38(3): 635-672. 
Lambert, R., D.  F.  Larker, et al. (1993). “The Structure of Organizational Incentives.” ASQ 38: 
438-461. 
Leonard, J. (1990).  Executive Pay and Firm Performance.  Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, 43, 13-29. 
Levine, D.  I. (1993). “What Do Wages Buy.” ASQ. 
Mehran, H. (1995). “Executive compensation structure, ownership and firm performance.” 
Journal of Financial Economics 38: 163-184. 
Milkovich, G.  T. (1988). “A Strategic Perspective on Compensation.” Research in Personnel 
and Human Resources Management 6: 263-288. 
Montemayor, E.  F. (1996). “Congruence between Pay  Policy and Competitive Strategy in High-
Performing Firms.” Journal of Management 22(6): 889-908. 
Pfeffer, J. (1990).  Incentives in Organizations: The importance of social relations.  Organization 
Theory: From Chester Barnard through the Present and Beyond.  O.  E.  Williamson.  
New York, Oxford University Press: 72-97. 
Pfeffer, J.  and G.  R.  Salancik (1978).  The External control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective.  New York, Harper & Row. 
Pfeffer, J.  and J.  Veiga (1999). “Putting People First for Organizational Success.” Academy of 
Management Executive 13(2): 37-48. 
Porter, M.  E. (1985).  Competitive Advantage.  New York, Free Press. 
Ruefli, T.  W., J.  M.  Collins, et al. (1999). “Risk Measures in Strategic Management Research: 
Auld Lang Syne?” Strategic Management Journal 20: 167-194. 
Scott, R. (1995).  Organizations.  Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall. 
Scott, W.  R. (1992).  Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems.  Englewood Cliffs, 
Prentice Hall. 
Welbourne, T.  and L.  Gomez-Meija (1995). “Gainsharing: A Critical Review and A Future 
Research Agenda.” Journal of Management 21(3): 559-609. 
Werner, S.  and H.  Tosi (1995). “Other People's Money: the Effects of Ownership on 
Compensation Strategy and Managerial Pay.” Academy of Management Journal 38(6): 
1672-1691. 
Williamson, O. (1981). “The Economics of Organization: The Transaction cost Approach.” ASJ: 
548. 
Wiseman, R.  M., Gomez-Mejia, L., & Fugate, M. (2000).  Rethinking Compensation Risk.  In S.  
Rynes & B.  Gerhart (Eds.), Compensation in Organizations (pp.  311-347).  San 
Francisco:  Jossey-Bass. 
 
 
Organization-wide Broad-based Incentives: CAHRS WP02-05 
 
 
Page 33 
Endnotes 
                                                 
i
 Other theories include institutional and resource-dependence theories. However, these theories 
are not included in this paper because they focus on institutional and political factors rather than 
organizational performance, which is the main issue being examined here.  
ii
  Our different results may have been the result of using different measures of risk (Ruefli, 1999). 
However, when we used stock-based measures of risk, the Black-Scholes measure of stock volatility, our 
results were similar. 
